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INTRODUCTION

Employment law liability claims can give rise to some unusual
coverage issues and present some practical claims handling
problems for both risk managers and insurers. This ArtiCle will dis
cuss the particular problems that arise when the relevant liability
policy is a "claims made" or "claims made and reported" policy.
This often is the case when an employer seeks coverage under a
Director's and Officer's ("D&O") policy or an Errors and Omis
sions ("E&O") policy. These issues promise to grow in significance
due to the fact that the Employment Practices Liability Policies now
emerging in the insurance market generally are nearly always writ
ten only on a "claims made" basis as well.
First and foremost, this Article analyzes what constitutes a
claim. In particular, this Article will discuss whether the filing of a
"charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") or a state human rights agency amounts to a "claim" for
insurance coverage purposes. Additionally, this Article describes
the reporting and notice requirements in a "claims made" policy
governing the information that must be provided to the insurer sub
sequent to the assertion of a claim. This Article discusses this issue
especially with respect to an employer's duties when it receives or
makes an offer to pay a nominal severance or settlement payment
to a terminated employee. Finally, the strategic importance of pro
* Wayne E. Borgeest is a partner in the New York City law finn of Wilson, Elser,
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker. Mr. Borgeest's practice is oriented towards director
and officer liability and D&O insurance, and he is the finn's National Coordinator for
D&O practice. Mr. Borgeest is a graduate of the State University of New York at
Geneseo and the Pace University School of Law. Anthony J. Fowler, and Michael M.
Santocki are associates at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker.
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viding a "laundry list" of information relative to possible claims will
be reviewed.
I.

EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: WHAT

Is

A "CLAIM"?

An initial and fundamental question in the arena of employ
ment law liability is what constitutes a "claim" for insurance cover
age purposes. Although litigated extensively in other contexts, the
issue is probably more difficult and problematic in the employment
law arena, given the variety of administrative and litigation venues.
There is, of course, no question that a legal action filed in court and
served on the employer constitutes a "claim" under virtually any
"claims made" liability policy. Coverage issues often arise, how
ever, relating to all the facts and circumstances that lead up to the
filing of a suit. For example, an employee unhappy with his annual
performance review might orally threaten to quit and file suit but
take no further action immediately. The employee may pursue the
matter by filing a "charge" or a grievanc~ with the EEOC, alleging
unlawful discriminatory conduct by the employer. The EEOC may
then, on its own initiative, refer the charge to a state agency or
human rights commission for review. Alternatively, the employee
may go directly to the state agency and file a "charge" that, in turn,
may be referred to the EEOC for handling. Significant uncertainty
exists as to which, if any, of these circumstances would be a claim
within the meaning of the "claims made" policy.
A.

Policy Definition of "Claim"

The first step in answering the question of what constitutes a
claim is to review the particular insurance policy to determine
whether it defines the word "claim." As a result of past uncer
tainty, many "claims made" policies now contain a definition for
the word "claim," but the definitions vary and mayor may not in
clude "administrative proceedings." A typical endorsement to a
widely used" claims made" policy from a Director and Officer in
surer contains the following definition: "The term 'Claim' shall
mean any judicial or administrative proceeding or specific written
demand initiated against a Director or Officer by a third party in
which such Director or Officer may be subjected to a binding adju
dication of liability for damages or other relief."l This definition
makes clear that a "claim" includes an administrative proceeding
1. See, e.g., Directors' and Officers' Liability Policy issued by Reliance Insurance
Company (on file with authors) (emphasis added).
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. before a state or federal agency, depending on the authority exer
cised by the agency. Therefore, in order to interpret this definition,
it is necessary to understand the substantive powers exercised by
the administrative agencies involved in the case.
State human rights agencies that are empowered to award
damages and demand services from individuals against whom
charges have been filed are said to have "coercive authority."
Agencies that cannot award damages and demand services are said
to have only "powers of conciliation." When the state agency has
powers of conciliation only and no powers of coercion, the agency
generaJ1y does have the power to refer the charge to a state court
for adjudication. Thus, it might appear at first glance that a charge
filed with such an agency may ultimately lead to an adjudication
that a named director or officer is liable for damages or other relief.
However, in this situation, it is only the court that can award dam
ages and compel relief. Therefore, a filing with such an agency does
not meet the full definition of a "claim." Of course, once the
charge is referred to the court and the employer is served with no
tice of such referral, the charge or potential claim becomes a
"claim" under the policy definition, thereby triggering coverage.
The federal EEOC, which is an agency with powers of concilia
tion only, is empowered to commence suit on its own initiative or
on behalf of an aggrieved party who has followed appropriate ad
ministrative procedures. However, this power alone also fails to
give rise to true coercive authority. The filing transfers the power
to the court, much as the state agency's referral would do, and the
court, not the agency, has coercive authority in these instances.
Due to the agency's lack of power, it can only call upon the court to
pick up where the agency leaves off. Once the EEOC has made the
decision to file suit, it becomes a litigant, and it is the filing of the
suit and service of the complaint which constitutes the actual claim.
For this reason, a mere filing with the EEOC may not constitute a
claim while a suit filed by the EEOC on behalf of the aggrieved
party clearly would constitute the making of a "claim" for insurance
coverage purposes.
In summary, when the policy defines the term "claim" to in
clude such things as administrative proceedings that "may" result in
an adjudication of liability, the insured will likely be able to estab
lish that it is entitled to coverage if the agency exercises coercive
authority. Such coverage normally would include payment or reim
bursement of counsel's fees for responding to the claim. On the
other hand, with regard to an administrative proceeding before an
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agency without coercive authority, the insurer will likely be able to
establish that no "claim" exists yet. This is true because the re
sponding party can only be subjected to a binding adjudication of
liability in a court, not through an administrative proceeding before
an agency.
However, it is important to remember that when policy lan
guage is subject to interpretation in coverage disputes, courts gener
ally adopt an interpretation that favors the interests of the insured
if there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Should a court determine
that the term "claim" is ambiguous, and that the policy engenders a
reasonable expectation that a non-coercive administrative proceed
ing constitutes a claim, the court might decide to honor this expec
tation by finding that coverage is afforded under the policy. Given
the interpretation preference for protecting the reasonable expecta
tions of insureds, many insurers decide to provide no definition in
the policy.2 The insured will often insist that a definition of claim is
provided by endorsement, thereby exposing the insurer to the risk
that the definition will be interpreted in an unintended manner.
B. Analysis when the Policy is Silent
1.

Charges Filed with the EEOC

If the policy in question does not contain a definition of the

word "claim," courts generally have held that the filing of a charge
with the EEOC does nothing more than initiate an investigative
proceeding since the EEOC lacks coercive authority. In Bensalem
. Township v. Western World Insurance Co. ,3 the underlying dispute
involved an age discrimination action brought against a township by
the widow of a township police officer. Prior to filing her lawsuit,
the widow had filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC sub
sequently corresponded with the township to advise it of the dis
crimination charge.
"
The court determined that the EEOC correspondence was not
a "claim" within the meaning of the policy. The court reasoned:
2. In one recent case, however, it was held that the mere absence of a definition
for the term "claim" in the policy rendered the determination of what was or was not a
claim inherently ambiguous. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walke, No. 92-0430, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8919 (C.D. La., Feb. 25, 1994). If this becomes a trend, insurers will do
well to provide more definitions of terms in the policy. This, of course, will lead to
longer and more complex policies, and more words lend greater potential for
ambiguity.
3. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (B.D. Pa. 1985).
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[T]he EEOC letter of September 1981 was at most a notice that
Mrs. Johnson intended to hold plaintiff responsible for a wrong
ful act. Neither the letter nor the attached charge of discrimina
tion requested money or other relief; neither document stated
that a lawsuit was to follow. The closest the letter comes to any
such formal demand is the statement that, upon receiving a
charge of discrimination, the EEOC is required to notify the pro
spective defendant and try to eliminate any alleged unlawful
practice by informal conciliation, conference and persuasion ....
This statement does indeed suggest that a formal lawsuit may fol
low (hence the term "prospective defendant"), but it also sug
gests that any such formal proceeding will be preceded by EEOC
efforts to resolve the matter informally. The letter thus informed
plaintiff that a demand for relief, based on a legal right, might
well follow. Neither the letter nor the charge, however, pur
. ported to be such a demand. 4

A number of other cases have established that it is not so much
the content of EEOC correspondence that is determinative as it is
the nature of the EEOC as a conciliating agency. In Campbell Soup
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.,5 twenty-two insurance compa
nies obtained summary judgment on the issue of whether they were
required to defend and indemnify Campbell Soup Company against
a discrimination claim pending before the EEOC. The Campbell
Soup case arose as a consequence of a charge filed by the EEOC
commissioner on September 29, 1980. On May 6,1986, the EEOC
found reasonable cause to believe that Campbell had engaged in
substantial discriminatory hiring and employment practices. The
reasonable cause determination issued by the EEOC alleged that
Campbell had discriminated against blacks and women because of
their race and/or sex with respect to recruitment, hiring, assign
ment, promotion, training, policies and practices, and other terms
and conditions of employment. Campbell contended that the rea
sonable cause determination was the functional equivalent of a suit
because it initiated an administrative procedure that was coercive in
nature. The insurers countered that the EEOC reasonable cause
determination merely sought to place the plaintiff in a conciliation
mode pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 2000(e)-5(b).
The narrow issue resolved by the court was whether a reason
able cause determination by the EEOC compels insurers, pursuant
to the terms of their liability policies, to defend insureds in EEOC
4. Id. at 1348 (citation omitted).
5. 239 N.J. Super. 403, 571 A.2d 969 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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proceedings, where such proceedings are conducted in response to
charges of discriminatory hiring and employment practices. In find
ing for the insurers, the court held that the EEOC's reasonable
cause determination was not "the functional equivalent of a suit" so
as to require the insurers to defend the insureds. The court agreed
with the decision of the trial court that the duty to defend is trig
gered when the insured is involved in an adversarial proceeding, a
consequence of which is the factual determination that legal liabil
ity mayor may not be imposed upon the insured. The court noted
that even though an EEOC probable cause determination was ad
missible in a subsequent federal action instituted by the EEOC or
the aggrieved party, this admissibility does not transform the
EEOC conciliation process into a coercive, adversarial proceeding
tantamount to a suit, for which a duty to defend is owed. The court
similarly found that there was no obligation of indemnification
under any of the policies. 6
2.

Charges Filed with State Agencies

The question of whether an administrative action constitutes a
claim in the absence of a policy definition is much more complex
with respect to filings with state agencies. Almost every state, with
the notable exceptions of Mississippi and Alabama, has its own
state agency or human rights commission. The powers of these
agencies vary in a number of respects. In many states, the human
rights agency has essentially the same conciliatory powers and au
thorities as the EEOC. Hence, for the reasons discussed in the pre
ceding section, the filing of a "charge" with a human rights agency
in those jurisdictions likely will not constitute a "claim." Other
state agencies, however, are empowered to do much more than sim
ply investigate charges of discrimination. Many state agencies are
empowered to award damages, including back pay, front pay, puni
tive, and compensatory damages. Hence, in these jurisdictions, the
filing of a "charge" with a state agency likely would constitute the
making of a "claim" within the meaning of a "claims made" policy.
Texas is an example of a state whose anti-discrimination laws
are substantially identical to the federal statutes and the EEOC reg
ulations. For example, Texas makes it an unlawful employment
6. See also Abifadel v. Cigna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(cease and desist order, examination report, and various other regulatory agency com
munications, taken together or separately, do not constitute claims absent specific de
mands for services or payments).
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practice for an employer to: (1) fail or refuse to hire an individual,
or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to com
pensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment be
cause of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for
employment in a way that would deprive or tend to deprive the
individual of employment opportunities,? The state agency charged
with enforcement of Texas' anti-discrimination laws is empowered
to investigate complaints and determine whether there is a "reason
able cause to believe" that an employer who is alleged to have vio
lated the anti-discrimination statute did in fact engage in unlawful
employment practices as alleged by the aggrieved party.8
Texas Labor Code sections 21.206 and 21.207 provide that
where there is reasonable cause to believe an employer has engaged
in an unlawful employment practice, a written determination to that
effect shall be issued and provided to the aggrieved party, the em
ployer, and other agencies as required by Texas law. This section
further provides that the agency must endeavor to eliminate alleged
unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. Barring the successful conciliation of
the claim, the commission and/or the aggrieved party's only re
course is to the courts. The commission cannot compel services or
award damages of its own accord. 9 Because any filing of a discrimi
nation claim with the Texas Commission on Human Rights would
not, therefore, be a demand for money or services, it would not
constitute a claim any more than the same filing with the EEOC.
To the extent the Texas Commission retains the power to initiate
suit on behalf of an insured or to enforce its holdings, it is the court,
not the commission, whose powers give rise to a claim at that time.
The laws of Texas contrast with those of other states such as
New York. In New York, if the New York State Division on
Human Rights finds that an employer has committed any unlawful
discriminatory practice, it may require that the offending employer:
cease and desist from such practice;lO take affirmative action;H or
7. TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West 1995).
8. §§ 21.002, 21.201-04.
9. §§ 21.210, 21.208,21.251-56.
10. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.4(c)(i) (McKinney 1995).
11. This power includes, but is not limited to hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading
of employees, with or without back pay, restoration to membership in any respondent
labor organization, admission to or participation in a guidance program, apprenticeship
training program, on the job training program, or other occupational training or retain
ing program. § 297.4(c)(ii).
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pay compensatory damages;12 and may report on the adequacy and
manner of the offending employer's compliance with any mandates
issued by the Division. 13 The New York State Division on Human
Rights also has extensive discretion in fashioning other remedies, as
long as these remedies bear a reasonable relation to the particular
discriminatory practice that has been found to exist, and to the pub
lic policies giving rise to the particular anti-discrimination statute
that has been violated. 14 Therefore, because the New York State
Division on Human Rights can award damages and compel services
from employers who violate New York Anti-Discrimination provi
sions, any filing with that agency by an allegedly aggrieved party
likely would constitute a claim for the purposes of coverage.
In summary, in order to determine whether an administrative
filing constitutes a claim, the employee's attorney must examine the
policy for relevant definitions, and then must examine state law to
determine whether the state agency has true coercive powers. An
EEOC charge, under established case law, does not constitute the
making of a claim. An insured should be aware, however, that re
course to the courts almost always amounts to a claim for purposes
of insurance coverage.
It

FAILURE TO GIVE PROMPT NOTICE

An insured's failure to give prompt notice of a "claim" consti
tutes a breach of contract and may result in forfeiture of coverage.
However, in many jurisdictions coverage is not forfeited unless the
insured's failure to give timely notice results in significant prejudice
to the insurer, thereby easing the burden on the insured considera
bly. The problem of late notice is particularly complex in the em
ployment litigation setting.
If a terminated employee files a charge with a state agency that
has coercive authority, and the insured fails to give notice until a
year or two later after the resolution of the administrative proceed
ing and the filing of a lawsuit by the same employee, the insurer
would undoubtedly argue that coverage should be denied, based
upon late notice and resulting prejudice. However, under the no
tice-prejudice rule adopted in many states, the prejudice threshold
is quite high. Generally, an insurer is not able to deny coverage
absent a showing that the claim no longer is defensible as a result of
12.
13.

§ 297.4(c)(iii).
§ 297.4(c)(v).

14. See, e.g., Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
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the untimely notice by the insured.1 5
A very different scenario arises under the more narrow "claims
made and reported" insurance policy. Under the terms of this type
of policy, the claim not only must be made during the policy period,
it also must be reported during the same policy period. Due to this
more explicit language regarding the reporting obligation, the re
porting aspect of the "claims made and reported" policy is generally
considered to be a condition precedent to coverage and is enforcea
ble irrespective of any prejudice to the insurer. Thus, it is impera
tive that an insured carefully consider the question of what
constitutes a claim and, where appropriate, give prompt notice of
that claim to its insurer. For example, in Bums v. International In
surance Co., 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the reporting requirement in a "claims made and
reported policy" was a condition precedent to the insured's right to
coverageP Therefore, the notice-prejudice rule did not apply.18
The courts in California19 and other jurisdictions20 have followed,
finding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to claims made
and reported policies.
The result of this kind of interpretation can be harsh. For ex
ample, in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Bauman?1 the court
held that a claim made during one policy period, but not reported
15. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King County, 749 F. Supp. 230 (W.O.
Wash. 1990). See also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a)
(1988).
16. 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. Id. at 1423.
18. Id. at 1425. See also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (Rausch),
270 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Q. App. 1990).
19. Slater v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Q. App. 1991) (a
claim filed during the policy period, but not served on the insured nor reported to the
insurer until after expiration of the policy, was not covered under a claims made and
reported policy); Merrill & Seeley, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 275 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (a claims-made policy's requirement that the insured's negligent act, the
claim, and the reporting of the claim to the insurer all occur during the policy period did
not violate public policy); Industrial Indem. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (trial court improperly required a claims made liability insurer to prove
it was prejudiced by the insured's failure to report a claim within the policy's one-year
extended reporting period).
20. Esmailzadeh v. Johnson & Speakman, 869 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1989); National
Union FIre Ins. Co. v. Bauman, No. 90 C 0340, 1992 WL 1738 (N.D. III. Jan. 2, 1992),
affd, 997 F.2d 305 (1993); Jefferson Guar. Bank v. Westbank-Marrero Cab Co., 570 So.
2d 498 (La. Q. App. 1990); Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. FIreman's Fund Ins. Co., 406 Mass.
862,551 N.E.2d 28 (1990); Continental Casualty Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.
Q. App. 1990); Safeco ntle Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 774 P.2d 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
21. Bauman, 1992 WL 1738.
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until the renewal policy's period, did not comply with either policy's
"claims made and reported" requirement. In Bauman, the court
specifically noted that the reporting requirement relates to a single
policy period, and an insured cannot utilize the renewal period to
satisfy the reporting requirement for claims first made during the
initial policy period.
In addition to the provision that makes it a condition precedent
to coverage that a claim be first made and reported during the pol
icy period, many policies' notice provisions place a duty on the in
sured to provide notice of the claim to the insurer "as soon as
practicable during the policy period." This places an additional ob
ligation on the insured to provide timely notice of a claim. To illus
trate the distinctive obligation of the notice provision, consider a
claim against an insured that is made on the first day of the policy
period. If the insured reports the claim on the last day of the policy
period (just short of a year later), the policy's reporting require
ment will be satisfied. There could be a question of late notice,
however, because the insured arguably failed to provide notice of
the claim "as soon as practicable." Under this example, although
the reporting requirement was satisfied, coverage may not be avail
able based upon untimely notice, particularly if the jurisdiction is
one following the notice-prejudice rule. When evaluating whether
the reporting provisions of a "claims made and reported" policy has
been satisfied, it is important to note any policy terms that specify
the requirements for reporting claims. For example, the policy may
provide that a claim is deemed reported when mailed to the insurer.
Of course, a prudent insured may want to err on the side of
caution and report to its insurer any' employment situation that
might ultimately result in a claim. The insured has little to lose and
much to gain by adopting this strategy. If a particular fact or cir
cumstance is not reported, and it ultimately turns out that it is
deemed to be a "claim," the insurer might be within its rights to
deny coverage, assuming that the reporting period has expired.
Furthermore, notice of facts or circumstances that the insurer
does not consider to be a claim may be accepted as notice of facts
or circumstances "likely to give rise to a claim." Most "claims
made" policies contain language that will relate a claim back to the
time at which notice of its facts or circumstances was provided. The
insurers avoid an avalanche of potential notices under these provi
sions by requiring "full particulars" with respect to names of wit
nesses, potential allegations and parties involved. If there is
insufficient information provided, the insurer may reject the notice
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of potential claim as insufficient, which will mean simply that any
claim ultimately arising will not relate back. Actual claims arising
from such inadequately described facts or circumstances may still
be covered if they are made within the same policy period or they
may be covered under a subsequent period.
III.

HANDLING THE EMPLOYEE PROBLEM: AVOIDING
PREJUDICE TO THE INSURER

It has become somewhat routine for employees, soon-to-be
terminated employees, and former employees to seek out settle
ments at the time of their discharge from employment. This can
arise under different circumstances, but the common theme is that
the employee demands, either orally or in writing, that he or she
receive additional compensation above that for which the employ
ment contract or the severance plan provides. The insured em
ployer is faced with the dilemma of whether to give notice of each
and every instance in which a terminated (or about-to-be-termi
nate d) employee seeks this additional compensation.
From one standpoint, the foregoing situation may present an
early and relatively inexpensive opportunity for the employer to
avert a larger liability problem in subsequent litigation. Thus, the
employer may regard the settlement demand as the assertion of a
claim against it. Consequently, the employer may seek to resolve
the dispute before it escalates into litigation. On the other hand,
the employer likely will be loathe to settle such "disputes," for fear
that all departing employees will seek such extraordinary compen
sation. From this perspective, the employee's demands do not
amount to a true claim as much as an effort to negotiate additional
benefits at termination.
. Depending upon the wording of the policy at issue, an oral de
mand for severance pay mayor may not constitute a "claim." If the
circumstances do not constitute a "claim," then the employer
should be free to try to compromise the demand. An issue arises,
however, if the employer attempts to settle an employee demand
without providing notice to the relevant insurers. If such efforts are
unsuccessful, resulting in litigation with a demand for damages sig
nificantly greater than the original demand, the insurer may balk at
providing coverage. Therefore, it is in the insured employers' best
interest to promptly give notice of facts and circumstances-as well
as full-blown claims-as they arise.
This strategy may pose some practical difficulties, however, for
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both the insured and the insurer. From the insured's standpoint,
reporting each and every incident in which an employee seeks addi
tional compensation could result in an increased premium at re
newal, based upon the number of reported incidents. An increased
premium might result even if the incidents ultimately are resolved
for nominal amounts of money. From the insurer's standpoint, the
reporting of an incident necessitates the opening of a file and claim
handling expenses on a matter that may never implicate the policy.
For these and other reasons, there is no perfect strategy for
reporting potential employment litigation, although the insured
clearly has an interest in acting in a manner that avoids forfeiture of
coverage. Any demand for compensation or severance pay from a
terminated employee could well escalate into a "claim" or litiga
tion. Failure to give prompt notice of these occurrences or inci
dents could cause some prejudice to the insurer in the event that
the insured's handling of the matter prior to notice to the insurer is
unsuccessful.
The case law is rather clear that an insured who settles a claim
without the insurer's written consent, where such written consent is
required under the policy, will defeat coverage altogether. 22 In ad
dition, the insurer may raise the issue of prejudice and late notice,
as described above. The insurer also may take the position that the
insured's handling of the incident rendered litigation more likely
and more serious, resulting in increased exposure to the insurer. As
a general rule, insurers will not complain if these types of incidents
are resolved by the insureds without notice to the insurer. The mo
ment that an unreported incident results in a claim or litigation,
however, the insurer may raise a policy defense that would not have
otherwise been available otherwise and that arises solely from the
conduct of the insured.
An example of these complexities is provided by Edinburg
Consolidated, l.S.D. v. INA a/Ida Pacific Employers Insurance CO.23
In Edinburg, a teacher requested a review before the state's educa
tion agency, challenging his termination by the school district for
which he previously worked. The district was empowered to award
damages, back pay, reinstatement, and costs.
The review took place prior to the policy period of the school
22. Central Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991);
Beck v. American Casualty Co., No. MO-88-CA-303, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13756
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 1990).
23. 806 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. a. App. 1991).
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district's E&O insurance policy. The school district did not give no
tice of the teacher's grievances until a suit was subsequently filed in
federal court. The suit plainly was premised on the same facts and
circumstances that gave rise to the grievance. The insurer in
Edinburg took the position that, although the suit was filed during
the policy period, the claim was not covered by the policies because
the insured had notice of it prior to the policy period and alterna
tively because the administrative hearing was a claim outside the
policy period. The court found for the insurer, holding that any
reasonable interpretation of the term "claim" encompassed the ad
ministrative proceeding at issue, especially in light of the fact that
back-pay and damages were sought.
Similarly, in Marion v. National Casualty CO.,24 a federal action
was filed by Marion, Illinois police officers alleging improper em
ployment practices by the city. The city sought coverage under a
"claims made and reported" E&O policy. Although the federal ac
tion was filed within the policy period, administrative disciplinary
proceedings had been going on for years prior to the actuallitiga
tion, and most of the administrative proceedings took place outside
the policy period.
The officers had made repeated threats to file suit during the
course of the administrative proceedings, but settlement negotia
tions continually convinced the officers to refrain. It was not until
the dispute reached its final administrative appeal that litigation
was commenced. The insurer refused coverage on the grounds that
the claim made at the time the administrative proceedings were be
ing conducted was made outside the policy period.
Although the trial court found for the city, the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the term "claim" connotes the asser
tion of a legal right, rather than the recognition of that right. The
Iowa Supreme Court felt that the multiple demands, threats of liti
gation, and continuing settlement negotiations during the adminis
trative proceedings were clear evidence a claim had been made,
notwithstanding the officers' failure to actually file litigation.
Consequently, employers must be aware of the insurance cov
erage implications of dealing with·employee grievances in the early
stages. The costs of an aggressive reporting strategy include admin
istrative efforts and probably higher premiums, but the cost of lax
reporting may well be a loss of coverage altogether for the claim in
question.
24.

431 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1988).

192

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 18:179

MISREPRESENTATION AT THE TIME OF UNDERWRITING

The issues of what constitutes a claim and whether the insured
may seek to compromise an employee grievance in its early stages
without affecting coverage are relevant also to the application and
underwriting processes. An employer applying for coverage under
one of the new employment practices liability policies will be re
quired to answer a long list of questions concerning EEOC filings,
state agency filings, and more generally, known employee
problems. To the extent that other coverage may be implicated by
employment law claims, however, the applications likely will be
much less specific regarding facts and circumstances about employ
ment-related problems that are known by the insured.
For example, an application for D&O liability coverage may
not ask about EEOC filings specifically: However, the application
undoubtedly will ask about the insured's knowledge of facts and
circumstances which might give rise to a claim. In this regard, one
court very recently has confirmed that failure to give notice of an
ticipated employment litigation at the time of application can result
in loss of coverage.25
When completing an application or renewal application an in
sured must carefully consider all events that have transpired that
may fall into the category of facts or circumstances that "might give
rise to a claim." If the employer fails to disclose employee griev
ances that might give rise to a claim for which it will demand cover
age, many jurisdictions will rescind an insurance policy issued on
incorrect applications. This rule, often dictated by statute, provides
that when an insured has made incorrect statements in an insurance
application, coverage can be barred where the statements are mate
rial to the risk insured, or where the insurer can show that it would
not have issued the policy under the same terms had it been in pos
session of accurate information. 26 There is no intent requirement
under many such statutes; unintentional or unknowing misstate
ments in an insurance policy application can bar coverage if they
alter the risk or the likelihood of a demand for coverage. 27
Returning to the example of the recently terminated employee
who demands payments in addition to those provided by the em
ployers' severance plan, the employer should be aware that if it fails
25. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. North Am. Specialty Ins. Co., No.
CV 94-46-02 LGB (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1994).
26. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahlen, 999 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1993).
27. Id. at 1536.
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to disclose this common employee demand at the time of the appli
cation, the insurer will have a potential coverage defense if the ap
plication requested information about such circumstances, and they
are not disclosed. Although it may not appear important to the em
ployer at the time, the insurer who has already seen many such in
formal demands escalate into litigation may be able to prove to a
court's satisfaction that it would have issued the policy under differ
ent terms had it been aware of the demand. The employer risks
little in reporting such demands as a matter of course, and in fact,
making it a standard practice to do so at the time of renewal appli
cations would serve to keep the insurer abreast of the frequency of
such demands and thus facilitate more efficient risk management.
V.

LAUNDRY LIST ISSUES

Based upon the foregoing, an insured employer might deem it
wise to provide a "laundry list" of facts and circumstances that may
give rise to a claim when it is getting off risk at the end of the re
porting period. The term "laundry list" refers to a submission by an
insured to its insurer-usually towards the end of the policy pe
riod-of a list of "circumstances" purporting to be notice of poten
tial claims under the policy.
A typical strategy for taking advantage of the policy's notice
provision, this amounts to an effort by an insured to keep the expir
ing policy alive. As stated above, the notice provision allows the
insured to report circumstances that might result in a claim being
made during the policy period. If the insured provides "notice"
properly, then any claims subsequently arising from the reported
circumstances-even if the claims are not first made until after the
expiration of the policy-will be deemed to have been made during
the policy period. Thus, the insured is motivated to provide a list of
any circumstances that could conceivably result in a claim at some
point in the future.
The issue then arises: do the "circumstances" described in the
insured's submission sufficiently provide "particulars" so as to con
stitute a proper notice of claim under the terms of the policy? Par
ticularity is required in order to allow the insurer to investigate the
potential claim. Although research reveals no cases involving em
ployment-practices allegations specifically, there are many cases in
volving banking, securities and fiduciary-type claims as potential
claims. The discussion that follows likely will apply equally to the
employment-practices field.
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The insured must take care to provide notice that is specific
and informative enough to apprise the insurer of the nature and
potential exposure posed by the facts or circumstances at issue.
Case law holds that mere recitation of the policy language does not
constitute adequate notice under a "claims made and reported"
policy. In FDIC v. Marvin L. Caplan,28 the court noted that the
insured, in attempting to provide notice of a potential claim against
directors and officers,
did no more than recite the language of the policy's notice provi
sion and identify the FDIC as the source of potential claims ....
The letter said nothing of the types of practices alleged to consti
tute "wrongful acts," the agents, officers, or directors alleged to
be involved in wrongdoing, or the time period during which the
allegedly wrongful act took place.

On that basis, the court held that, although notice was timely, it was
insufficient under a "claims made and reported" policy. The court
stated: "In a claims made policy ... the exact peril insured against
is the insured's discovery and notice of claims. Notice to the in
surer, under such a policy, is not merely a technical defense, ... it
defines the insurer's obligation, and thus the injured party's rights,
under the law .... "29
In United Association Local 38 Pension Trust Fund v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. ,30 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit denied an insured's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the issue of whether the insured's submission of "every
day financial data" constituted proper notice of facts or circum
stances likely to give rise to a claim was a question of fact for a jury.
The insureds, trustees of an employees' benefit trust, submitted a
renewal application to the insurer during the policy period together
with a "5500" form. The 5500 form is a document that benefit plans
must file with the Department of Labor. After the expiration of the
policy, the Department of Labor asserted a claim against the in
sureds. The 5500 form contained information that eventually be
came the subject of the Department of Labor claim.
.
The insureds sued for coverage under the expired policy for
expenses arising from the claim, arguing that the 5500 form pro
vided the insurer with notice of a claim during the policy period.
The insurer argued that the 5500 form merely contained "everyday
28. 838 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. La. 1994).
29. Id. at 1131 (citation omitted).
30. 790 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion amended, 811 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1987).
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financial data" and could not therefore constitute notice under the
policy. Even though the subject policy did not have the "full partic
ulars" language contained in many claims made and reported poli
cies, the court found that the issue was at least deserving of jury
consideration.
The cases are qualified to some extent by the holding in Fed
eral Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Burdette. 31 In Burdette, a
federal district court held that a D&O insurer's failure to object to
the sufficiency of its insured's notice of facts and circumstances
"likely to give rise to a claim" waived its right to do so later. The
insured had sent the D&O carrier two letters describing potential
claims that it thought might be asserted against the insured's direc
tors and officers. The D&O insurer acknowledged receipt of the
letters but did not question or challenge the sufficiency of the detail
contained therein.
In a subsequent declaratory judgment action filed by the in
sured, the D&O insurer argued that the two letters did not comply
with the policy's notice provision and therefore did not constitute
proper notice under the policy. The court rejected this argument,
noting as follows:
[The D&O carrier] did not in any way question the sufficiency of
the notice, nor did [it] attempt to obtain any more specific infor
mation relating to the identification of the officers and directors
to be sued. If notice provided to an insurer is considered by the
insurer to be defective, good faith requires the insurer to notify
the insured of its objections within a reasonable time, and if the
insurer fails to do so or proceeds to act as though notice was
satisfactory, it has waived any right to assert notice as a defense
at a later date. 32

On the substantive issue of whether the claims ultimately as
serted against the directors and officers were described in the notice
letters previously forwarded to the D&O carrier, the court noted
that:
[n]otification as to one loss or claim does not constitute notifica
tion as to another ... and it would certainly tum the notice provi
sion in this policy into a nullity to permit notice as to the action
of one director on a certain date to constitute notice as to an
other director's unrelated action on a different date. 33
31. 718 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
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Hence, the court held that although the insurer waived its right to
contest the sufficiency of the notice, the insurer was not required to
afford coverage with respect to claims that were not described in
the notice letters provided.
In the context of employment issues, the "laundry list" might
indicate simply that several employees were terminated. Those in
dividuals might conceivably make a claim arising from their em
ployment against the insured at some future date. The question
then arises: what sort of notice will be adequate under an insurance
policy such that coverage will be available under the policy after
expiration of the reporting period?
In this regard, the general rule is that the adequacy of notice of
facts and circumstances prior to policy termination will turn on the
language of the policy. Some policies require that the insured pro
vide the identity of the claimant, the nature of the wrongful acts,
the damages alleged, and the circumstances by which the insured
became aware of the potential claim. As a general principal, if the
insured is able to articulate the reasons for expecting a claim and to
otherwise provide the particulars as required by the policy, it is
more likely that coverage will be afforded at some future date
based upon the prior notice of a potential claim. Where the "laun
dry list" looks more like a prophylactic measure, merely giving the
names of terminated employees with a suggestion that claims and
litigation might follow, the likelihood of coverage becomes more
remote.
Insureds who fail to provide satisfactory information and detail
regarding potential claims during the policy period often attempt to
characterize "notice of potential claim" provisions as ambiguous,
thereby triggering an interpretation that favors their interest. This
ambiguity often is difficult to establish given the clear and specific
language employed by most insurers to set forth notice require
ments. Courts have consistently rejected, however, insureds' at
tempts to characterize "notice of potential claims" proviSIons as
ambiguous. 34
Insureds sometimes take the position that the insurer has not
been prejudiced by the lack of detail in a laundry list letter. How
ever, courts consistently hold that an alleged absence of prejudice
34. See, e.g, American Casualty Co. v. Wilkinson, No. CIY-89-1609-W, 1990 WL
302175 (W.D. Ok. 1990), affd 958 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1992); American Casualty Co. v.
FDIC, 944 F. 2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Continental Casualty Co., 796 F.
Supp. 1344, 1352 (D. Or. 1991).
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to an insurer based upon insufficient notice is irrelevant in the con
text of "claims made" policies. 35 As the court stated in American
Casualty Co. v. Wilkinson, "the critical and distinguishing feature of
a 'claims made' policy is notice in accordance with the terms of the
policy: absent notice during tI,.e policy period, there is no
coverage. "36
CONCLUSION

As has been illustrated, employment-practices claims and their
surrounding circumstances give rise to many difficult coverage is
sues under "claims made" policies. The threshold issue, of course,
is what constitutes a claim. The resolution of this issue often de
pends on the specific language of the policy at issue and also on the
jurisdiction within which an employee resides. Some certainty is
gained where a policy provides a definition of what constitutes a
claim. If the insured's policy has no such definition, then the in
sured and the insurer need a clear understanding as to what should
and should not be reported as a claim.
In those instances where the policy provides no guidance, the
common law definition of "claim" may be no more than a demand
for money or services. A filing with an administrative agency that is
not empowered to award damages or compel other relief services
generally is not considered a claim. Many state agencies and the
EEOC fall into this category. When such an agency resorts to the
additional power of the courts, however, a claim generally will be
considered to have been made. Many state agencies can award
damages and compel relief, and insureds and insurers' should be
cognizant of the powers of each particular agency.
Even where no claim has been made, it is prudent to be aware
of when policies require or allow notice of facts or circumstances
"likely to give rise to a claim." Most insurance applications and
some renewal applications will inquire about facts or circumstances
likely to give rise to a claim as a condition to issuing a policy. A
failure to address questions fully from an insurer in this regard can
result in a coverage denial in the future. On the other hand, a pru
dent policy of providing notice of appropriate facts or circum
stances to insurers will avoid such unexpected coverage denials and
may not materially affect pr~miums. Both insurers and insureds
35. Wilkinson, 1990 WL 302175.
36. Id. at *5.
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can benefit from a greater knowledge of what mayor may not con
stitute a claim under policies in effect between them.
Insureds and insurers should be aware of their rights and obli
gations under any insurance policy. Because the law is unsettled
regarding the extent to which demands for extraordinary severance
by terminated or soon-to-be-terminated employees might constitute
a claim and the extent to which negotiations in that regard might
constitute settlement without an insurer's authority, an insured
should take care to notice all such incidents for which coverage may
ultimately be desired. The law is well settled that settlement with
out authority, where such authority is required under the policy,
will support a coverage denial.
Finally, an insured should be aware of the nature of the partic
ular policy they purchased. "Claims made" and "claims made and
reported" policies are not the same, and the "claims made and re
ported" policy provides coverage only for claims both made and
reported within the same policy period, usually one year. Most
courts have strictly upheld the claims made and reported provisions
of these policies. Particular care should therefore be taken by an
insured to stay current on policy renewals, and especially prompt
notice should be given to claims made near the end of a policy
period.

